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NOTES
TAXATION AND PERSONAL INJURY
AWARDS: THE SEARCH FOR WORKABLE
GUIDELINES
The definition of gross income set forth in section 61(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") includes all items not specifi-
cally excluded by statute.1 Section 104(a)(2) of the Code excludes
from this definition amounts received as damages for personal in-
juries. Two issues have arisen with respect to this exclusion. The
1 I.R.C. § 61(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 61(a) lists fifteen common items of
gross income including compensation for services, rents, royalties, interest, alimony pay-
ments, and annuities. Id. The accompanying regulations state that gross income is not lim-
ited to those items enumerated in section 61 and list several additional miscellaneous items
of gross income for purposes of illustration. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (as amended in
1965) (including, inter alia, punitive damages and illegal gain). Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the statutory language indicates that Congress intended
to exert the full force of its taxing power. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426, 429 (1955). Consequently, section 61(a) has been liberally construed "in recognition of
the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically exempted." Id. at 430.
2 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1982). The section provides:
(a) In general
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deduc-
tions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior
taxable year, gross income does not include-
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and
whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or
sickness ....
Id. Damages are defined by the regulations as amounts received "through prosecution of a
legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement
entered into in lieu of such prosecution." Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970). The
exemption extends to awards for nonphysical personal injuries including defamation. Haw-
kins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1927). It does not, however, extend to amounts
awarded to compensate damages arising from business injuries because such injuries have
not been classified as personal injuries. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 699 (9th
Cir. 1983). Historically, this exclusion also applied to wrongful death recoveries. See Ander-
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first is whether the gross (before-tax) income rule or the net (after-
tax) income rule should be applied when calculating damages. This
issue arises because the exclusion from gross income extends to
amounts received as compensation for lost earnings.3 A majority of
jurisdictions apply the "gross income rule," under which evidence
of the amount of income tax that would have been paid by the
plaintiff is excluded and lost earnings are calculated based on the
plaintiff's gross income.4 Under the minority rule, evidence of the
income tax which would have been payable on lost earnings is ad-
missible and lost earnings are then calculated based on after-tax
son v. United Air Lines, 183 F. Supp. 97, 97 & n.1 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1
C.B. 47; Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179, 180. Recently, however, the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") reversed its prior position, holding that the proceeds of a claim under Ala-
bama's wrongful death statute were not excludable under section 104(a)(2). Rev. Rul. 84-
108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 34. Relying on Alabama case law which construed wrongful death dam-
ages as punitive, the IRS reasoned that the amount was not received on account of a per-
sonal injury. Id. However, one federal district court sitting in Alabama did not follow this
ruling, stating that "Revenue Ruling 84-108 constitutes an unwarranted administrative
amendment of the clear language of the Internal Revenue Code and cannot stand." See
Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 635, 636 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
The exclusion from gross income of damages received for personal injuries does not
apply to amounts received as reimbursement for medical expenses that the taxpayer has
deducted on a prior year's income tax return under section 213. I.R.C. § 104(a) (1982). An
award which includes reimbursement for previously deducted medical expenses must be re-
ported as income in the year it was received to the extent of the amount of the previous
deduction. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(g)(1) (as amended in 1979); see Frolik, The Convergence of
LR.C. § 104(a)(2), Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt and Structured Tort Settle-
ments: Tax Policy "Derailed," 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 565, 568-69 (1983).
3 See Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1249-50 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); see also Klawonn v. Mitchell, 105 Ill. 2d 450, 453, 475 N.E.2d 857,
858 (1985) (exemption applies to compensation for losses of both past and future wages
despite fact that wages would have been taxed had victim not been injured); Rev. Rul. 85-
97, 1985-2 C.B. 50 (entire amount received as settlement of personal injury suit, including
amount allocable to loss of wages, is excludable from gross income). The IRS, however, has
not been consistent in its application of the exemption for damages received on account of
lost earnings due to personal injury or sickness. See Jaeger, Owens & Fields, Taxability of
Damages-An Analysis of the Current IRS Position, 18 TAx ADVISER 432, 432 (1987).
4 See Johnson v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 71 N.Y.2d 198,
206, 519 N.E.2d 326, 330, 524 N.Y.S.2d 415, 419 (1988). The primary rationale given by
courts applying the gross income rule is that future income tax laws are too speculative to
allow prediction of a person's future income taxes. See, e.g., Flannery v. United States, 297
S.E.2d 433, 440 (W. Va. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); Reeves v. Louisiana &
Ark. Ry., 304 So. 2d 370, 377 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 305 So. 2d 125 (La. 1974); see also
infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussing factors that must be predicted). Courts
also suggest that Congressional intent to confer a humanitarian benefit upon tort victims is
frustrated if only the tortfeasor may reap the benefit of the tax savings. See Lumber Termi-
nals, Inc. v. Nowakowski, 36 Md. App. 82, 98, 373 A.2d 282, 292 (1977); see also infra notes
71-76 and accompanying text (discussing confusion in various state courts as to proper situ-
ations in which to apply gross income rule).
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income.'
The second issue arising with respect to section 104(a)(2) is
whether or not the jury should be instructed that damage awards
are not subject to federal income tax." Here, too, there has been
disagreement among the courts. The traditional approach has been
to disallow an instruction that damage awards are tax exempt.'
However, an increasing number of courts have held that the in-
struction is discretionary with the trial judge,8 while others have
even held that the instruction is mandatory'
5 See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 494 (1980) (evidence of impact of
income taxes on future earnings admissible in FELA proceeding); Burlington N., Inc., v.
Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 292 (9th Cir. 1975) (excluding evidence of impact of future taxa-
tion on potential earnings has possible overcompensation effect).
' See Frolik, supra note 2, at 583. Initially, this issue arose when defendants began
requesting an instruction that the award was exempt from income tax on the theory that
juries ignorant of section 104(a)(2) would assume the award was taxable and possibly in-
crease the award to compensate the victim for those taxes. See Nordstrom, Income Taxes
and Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212, 213 (1958); Note, Damages-The Role
of Income Tax Exemption in Actions for Personal Injuries-Dempsey v. Thompson, 251
S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1952), 32 TEx. L. REv. 108, 110-11 (1953); see also Comment, Income Taxa-
tion and the Calculation of Tort Damage Awards: The Ramifications of Norfolk and West-
ern Railway v. Liepelt, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 289, 294 (1981) (court extended lati-
tude by allowing evidence relating to taxes in jury instruction).
See, e.g., Losey v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 792 F.2d 58, 61-62 (6th
Cir. 1986) (refusing to instruct jury that damage award is tax exempt); Kennett v. Delta Air
Lines, 560 F.2d 456, 462 (1st Cir. 1977) (jury not to consider tax consequences in wrongful
death award); Hildyard v. Western Fasteners, Inc., 33 Colo. App. 396, 406-07, 522 P.2d 596,
602 (1974) (refusal to give instruction that jury should not add or subtract from award be-
cause verdict not income held proper); Singh v. Air Ill., Inc., 165 Ill. App. 3d 923, 931, 520
N.E.2d 852, 859 (1988) (trial court may refuse jury instructions indicating award would be
exempt from federal income tax); Senter v. Ferguson, 486 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972) (instruction to jury on tax consequences of personal injury award deemed prejudicial
error).
8 See, e.g., Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117, 1123 (6th Cir. 1974) (not
reversible error in personal injury action to advise jury that award will not be subject to
federal income tax); Nichols v. Marshall, 486 F.2d 791, 794 (10th Cir. 1973) (same); Ander-
son v. United Air Lines, 183 F. Supp. 97, 97-98 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (within discretion of trial
judge to include instruction explaining tax consequences); Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Gordon,
660 P.2d 428, 433-34 (Alaska 1983) (instruction properly denied absent showing that juries
in general increase recoveries in amount of taxes or that particular court increased verdict
by amount of taxes); Fox v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 133 Cal. App. 3d 565, 571, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 87, 90 (1982) (although proper to give instruction, refusal to do so not error since
income tax instruction can be confusing); St. John's River Terminal Co. v. Vaden, 190 So.
2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (not error to refuse instruction), cert. denied, 200 So. 2d
814 (Fla. 1967).
9 See, e.g., Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d Cir.) (few
members of general public aware of exemption; instruction will dissuade juries from increas-
ing award), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); Blanchfield v. Dennis, 292 Md. 319, 327, 438
A.2d 1330, 1334-35 (1982) (potentially harmful error not to proffer requested instruction);
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This Note will examine the inherent complexities of the net
income rule, and suggest that some courts' efforts to reach a mid-
dle ground by allowing evidence in some cases but not others sim-
ply adds to the inconsistencies already existing in this area. It will
be suggested that under current Code section 104(a)(2), the gross
income rule is preferable. Furthermore, suggested amendments to
this section that would repeal the tax exemption for amounts paid
as lost earnings, thereby bringing it into conformity with generally
accepted tax theory, will also be examined. Finally, this Note will
discuss the anomaly that exists when a court instructs a jury that
an award is not subject to taxation, yet further instructs that in-
come taxes are irrelevant and should not be considered in calculat-
ing a damage award. This Note will suggest that the question of
whether a jury should be instructed on the nontaxability of an
award should be left to the discretion of the trial judge, and that
the court should allow such an instruction only if the issue has
been brought to the jury's attention during trial or if a juror has
made such an inquiry.
GROSS VERSUS NET INCOME
The predecessor of section 104(a)(2) was enacted in 191910
and, until its 1983 revision, reappeared in subsequent statutes with
few substantive changes.1 The section received scant attention in
Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 342, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952) (sensible to instruct jury
that any award they grant will not be subject to federal or state income taxes); Bussell v.
DeWalt Prods. Corp., 105 N.J. 223, 229, 519 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1987) (when requested, trial
court should instruct jury as to nontaxability of damage award).
,o Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (amended
1983); see Frolik, supra note 2, at 591 n.126 (Congress considered it doubtful that amounts
received for personal injuries should be included in gross income) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1918)); see also Chapman, No Pain-No Gain? Should Per-
sonal Injury Damages Keep Their Tax Exempt Status, 9 U. ARK. LirrLE ROCK L.J. 407,
413-17 (1987) (same); Henry, Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: The Taxation of Personal
Injury Recoveries, 23 Hous. L. REv. 701, 702 (1986) (discussing confusion that exists despite
minimal modifications of section).
" The most significant amendment to section 104(a)(2) was enacted in 1983. See I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). Congress amended the section to exclude from income damages
received "whether as lump sums or as periodic payments." Id. The legislative intent was to
provide statutory certainty that periodic payments were excludable. See S. RE. No. 646,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADIN. NEWS 4580, 4583.
The passage of this amendment encouraged the use of structured tort settlements. See
Frolik, supra note 2, at 566, 572-74. However, since a portion of each periodic payment
received pursuant to the structured settlement represents interest to the recipient, "exclud-
ing the entire amount of these periodic payments from gross income produces 'horizontal'
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its early years, undoubtedly because individual income tax rates
were relatively insignificant prior to the 1940's.12 As income tax
rates increased, however, defendants in personal injury actions be-
gan to argue that it was inequitable to calculate damages for lost
earnings based on gross income without making a reduction for
taxes saved."3 They argued that the party being compensated
would not have received such a large amount had he not been in-
jured.' 4 Hence, defendants maintained that the gross income rule
resulted in overcompensation to the plaintiff and that the net in-
come rule should have been applied.' 5 In response, advocates of
the gross income rule argued that the net income rule contravened
the humanitarian intent of Congress,"6 unnecessarily complicated a
jury's award calculation 7 and ignored economic realities.'8
The New York Court of Appeals recently addressed these con-
tentions in Johnson v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Oper-
ating Authority. In Johnson, the mother of a deceased child
brought a wrongful death action.20 At trial, the defendant sought
inequities in the tax treatment of personal injury claimants. Those claimants who accept a
deferred payment arrangement receive more favorable tax treatment than those claimants
who accept lump-sum settlements." Id. at 566. The inequity arises because the claimant
receiving a lump sum settlement will be taxed on any interest earned on investment of the
award. Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59.
12 See Nordstrom, supra note 6, at 212.
" See Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1944). The Stokes court was the
first to address the issue, holding that deductions from a personal injury award for income
tax were "too conjectural." Id.
, See Chapman, supra note 10, at 416. The law of damages attempts to put the plain-
tiff in as good a position as if he had not been injured. See, e.g., Great Am. Surplus Lines
Ins. Co. v. Bass, 486 So. 2d 789, 793 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 489 So. 2d 245 (La. 1986);
Abbinett v. Fox, 103 N.M. 80, 86, 703 P.2d 177, 183 (1985) (principal of making injured
party whole); see also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEEroN & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984) ("primary purpose is to compensate for dam-
age suffered at the expense of the wrongdoer"); J. STIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY, PERSONAL
INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS § 1 (1972) (goal of returning plaintiff to status quo).
See Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 292 (9th Cir. 1975).
26 See Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 151-52, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955);
Frolik, supra note 2, at 566; see also infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing
humanitarian intent).
11 See, e.g., Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1970) ("Under
our present complicated tax laws, the possibilities that a fact finder would have to consider
defy imagination."), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972); Highshew v. Kushto, 135 N.E.2d
251, 256 (Ind. 1956) (discussing numerous variables to consider); see also infra notes 47-52
& 73-76 and accompanying text (same).
'" See Frolik, supra note 2, at 566.
1 71 N.Y.2d 198, 519 N.E.2d 326, 524 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1988).
20 Id. at 202, 519 N.E.2d at 327, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
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to introduce evidence of the decedent's after-tax income in the cal-
culation of damages based on lost earnings.21 The trial court disal-
lowed this evidence. On defendant's appeal,22 the Appellate Divi-
sion, First Department, upheld the trial court's ruling.23 The Court
of Appeals subsequently affirmed the First Department, holding
that "no deduction or consideration of after-tax net should be al-
lowed into evidence or charged to the jury." A contrary rule, the
court stated, would "inject an unacceptably speculative and dis-
tracting feature into the jury's consideration of damages."24 Writ-
ing for the court, Judge Bellacosa found support in recent New
York legislation 25 specifically authorizing the consideration of af-
ter-tax income in personal injury and wrongful death actions based
on medical or dental malpractice.26 The court stated that the stat-
ute "clearly suggests that any expansion of these rules for now
should come from the Legislature," and that it was "pertinent to
note that this limited statutory authorization came about in the
context . . . of the .. . insurance and liability crises. '27 Judge
Bellacosa acknowledged that the decision was contrary to that in
Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt,28 the leading United States
Supreme Court decision for cases brought under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act ("FELA").29
In Liepelt, the Supreme Court held that the effect of income
taxes should be considered in calculating lost earnings in cases
arising under FELA.30 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens re-
jected the argument that income taxes are too conjectural and too
21 Id. at 201, 519 N.E.2d at 327, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
22 Id. at 201, 203, 519 N.E.2d at 326, 328, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 416, 417.
23 Id. at 203, 519 N.E.2d at 328, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
24 Id. at 204, 519 N.E.2d at 328-29, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
22 Id.; see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4546 (McKinney 1986); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 5-4.3(c) (McKinney 1986).
21 Johnson, 71 N.Y.2d at 205, 519 N.E.2d at 329, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 418-19.
27 Id.
28 444 U.S. 490 (1980); see Johnson, 71 N.Y.2d at 204, 519 N.E.2d at 328-29, 524
N.Y.S.2d at 418.
29 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
20 Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 493-94. Liepelt involved a wrongful death action brought under
FELA. Id. at 491. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of
$775,000, despite the existence of expert testimony offered by defendant calculating the
plaintiff's net pecuniary loss at $138,327. Id. at 492. On appeal, the appellate court held that
it was "'not error to exclude evidence of the effect of income taxes on future earnings of the
decedent.'" Id. at 491 (quoting Liepelt v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 62 Ill. App. 3d 653, 669, 378
N.E.2d 1232, 1245 (1978)).
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complex for a jury to consider.3 1 Justice Stevens likened taxes to
other factors routinely considered in calculating lost earnings, such
as the future health of the plaintiff, future interest rates, and fu-
ture inflation, pointing out that these issues are also subject to es-
timation and prediction.3 2 He further noted that application of the
net income rule logically requires application of the "add-back"
rule, which, once the initial calculation is made on an after-tax ba-
sis, requires the "add back" of interest projected to be earned from
investment of the award.3 Justice Stevens determined that the ne-
cessity of this further adjustment did not preclude the use of the
after-tax calculation.3 4 Finally, Justice Stevens rejected the argu-
ment that the net income rule runs contrary to a humanitarian in-
tent of Congress, stating that he found no evidence of such an in-
tent in the legislative history of section 104(a)(2). s1
Dissenting, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, sug-
gested two probable purposes for the exclusion from gross income
of amounts received as damages for personal injuries.3 6 The first
was the intent of Congress "to confer a humanitarian benefit on
the victim ...of the tort. '37 Justice Blackmun noted that if this
S Id. at 494. Justice Stevens stated that "effective methods of presenting the essential
elements of an expert calculation in a form that is understandable by juries [have been
developed]." Id.
The argument that evidence regarding future income taxes is too conjectural or specula-
tive for the jury has been proffered since the early cases addressing the issue. See, e.g.,
Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1944) (no error in court's refusal to deduct
income tax because such deductions too conjectural); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339,
345-46, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952) (jury should be instructed not to consider taxes in fixing
amount of award because they cannot be accurately estimated); Smith v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
47 Ohio Op. 49, 54, 99 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ct. App. 1950) (per curiam) (deduction of income
"too speculative" to be considered by jury). But see Floyd v. Fruit Indus., 144 Conn. 659,
672, 136 A.2d 918, 925 (1957) (factor of income tax no more speculative than other factors
submitted to jury).
11 Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 494; see also Floyd, 144 Conn. at 672, 136 A.2d at 925 (income
taxes no more speculative than many other factors considered). But see McWeeney v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir.) (difficulties of one element in formula does
not justify addition of another), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
'3 See Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 495; see also infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing add-back rule).
3, Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 495.
" Id. at 496 n.10. The legislative history of the statute as originally enacted suggests
only that Congress believed it doubtful that the law required amounts received as damages
for personal injuries to be included in gross income under the sixteenth amendment. H.R.
REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918); see Chapman, supra note 10, at 414; Nord-
strom, supra note 6, at 222; infra note 69 and accompanying text.
36 See Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 501-02 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 501 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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was indeed a purpose, the net income rule would not only destroy
the humanitarian benefit, but would, in fact, transfer the benefit
from the victim to the tortfeasor55
The second probable purpose suggested by Justice Blackmun
was a Congressional desire to avoid imposing the burdensome task
of approximating the tax when computing an award.39 Justice
Blackmun pointed out that if Congress decided it was not worth
the effort to estimate the victims' tax liability "on behalf of the
public fisc, it is unlikely that it would want to require this effort on
behalf of the tortfeasor. ' 40
Complexities of the Net Income Rule
The net income rule requires a jury to predict both future in-
come tax laws and the plaintiff's future tax situation.41 The many
variables affecting an individual's future tax position, coupled with
an ever changing tax law, makes this a difficult, if not impossible,
task.4 To illustrate, at the time of the 1980 Supreme Court deci-
" Id. at 502 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). If the plaintiff would have "earned" the income
from an employer, the employer would have been required to pay out the plaintiff's gross
income, and the plaintiff would have been responsible for his own taxes. Under the net
income rule, the defendant does not have to pay the amount of plaintiff's gross income, he
need only pay the net income, and thus the rule "operate[s] to assist the tortfeasor by way
of a benefit, perhaps even a windfall." Id. at 499 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 501 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 502 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It is suggested that this argument is similar to
the argument that introduction of a plaintiff's income tax violates the collateral source rule,
which prohibits introduction into evidence of benefits a plaintiff receives from third parties.
See Sedler, The Collateral Source Rule and Personal Injury Damages: The Irrelevant
Principle and the Functional Approach, 58 Ky. L.J. 36, 36 (1969); see also Nordstrom,
supra note 6, at 222. Dean Nordstrom noted that some courts have drawn an analogy be-
tween insurance and the congressional exclusion of damage awards from gross income: the
intent of Congress to provide a benefit to injured persons is similar to insurance against
injury. Id. Since insurance is subject to the collateral source rule, so too is the exclusion. Id.;
see, e.g., Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 581, 271 A.2d 94, 97 (1970)
(tortfeasor has no "legitimate interest" in taxes plaintiff owes); St. Johns River Terminal
Co. v. Vaden, 190 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (tax is matter strictly between
plaintiff and taxing authority), cert. denied, 200 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1967); Hall v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 5 IlM. 2d 135, 152, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955) (whether plaintiff pays tax concerns
only plaintiff and government).
" See, e.g., McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 36-37 (2d Cir.) (use
of net income rule would require intensive speculation on questions of future tax exemp-
tions, deductions, credits, and rates), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); see also Nordstrom,
supra note 6, at 228 (evidence of net income could result in turning every negligence case
into trial of future tax structure).
'2 See, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir.) (en banc)
(per curiam) (evidence of income taxes would compound complexity and difficulty facing
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sion in Liepelt, the maximum income tax rate was seventy per-
cent.43 Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the "Act"), the maxi-
mum effective income tax rate for individuals is twenty-eight
percent.44 A jury calculating lost earnings under the net income
rule in 1980 surely would have overestimated the taxes of any
plaintiff who would have, but for the injury, continued to work,
because of the marked decrease in tax rates just six years later."'
Much of the legal commentary in favor of the net income rule was
written prior to the passage of the Act,46  when this dramatic
change in individual rates was perhaps inconceivable. Since the
Act's passage, however, it is suggested that the argument that the
net income rule is too speculative has been considerably strength-
ened. Changes in the tax laws may affect not only the individual's
tax rate, but every factor relevant to the calculation of an individ-
jury in reducing proof to monetary award), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975); Dempsey v.
Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 345-46, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952) (impossible to compute amount of
tax liability with reasonable accuracy). But see Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d
284, 292-93 (9th Cir. 1975). The Boxberger court held that evid6nce of future income taxes
could be considered upon the taking of judicial notice of current tax rates and by giving
cautionary jury instructions. Id. The court further stated:
While not subject to precise mathematical exactitude, such a projection does not
appear to be too uncertain, conjectural, or speculative for the jury to consider.
Certainly, such considerations are no more speculative than the possibility of
death from natural causes, disabling, non-compensable injuries from other causes,
or the future instability of familial relationships.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Nordstrom, supra note 6, at 227 (prediction of future in-
come tax no more speculative than continuance of, or increase in, plaintiff's salary).
43 See Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, tit. I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2767 (amended
1981, 1983 & 1986). The 1980 tax schedule for single individuals had a graduated rate reach-
ing 70% when the individual's taxable income reached $108,300. Id.
"' See I.R.C. § 1 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In actuality, there are three tax rates: 15%,
28%, and 33%. See id. Technically, the highest rate is 33%, although this rate serves only
to phase out the 15% bracket for persons reaching a specified income level. Id. § 101. In
effect, this causes such a person's entire taxable income to be taxed at the maximum rate of
28%; without this 5% surcharge, a portion of such individual's income would be taxed at
15% and the remainder at 28%. Id. This 5% rate adjustment also phases out personal ex-
emptions for upper-income taxpayers. See The RIA Complete Analysis of the '86 Tax Re-
form Act, Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) % 102 (1986) [hereinafter RIA Analysis].
" Any jury deliberating prior to 1986 would have been likely to assume that the plain-
tiff would have a maximum tax rate far in excess of 28%. See, e.g., O'Connor v. United
States, 269 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1959) (estimate could be based on current rates since it is
unlikely there would be substantial reduction in federal income tax rates in future).
46 See, e.g., Comment, Tax Issues of Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Awards, 19
TULSA L.J. 702, 717 (1984). In 1984, one commentator stated that the "fear of undercompen-
sation caused by changes in the tax rates is unfounded. Empirical evidence demonstrates
that a plaintiff's future tax liability will worsen given the massive federal deficits." Id.; see
also Brin, Economic Projections in Determination of Damages; Inflation and Income
Taxes, 24 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 14, 19-22 (1974) (favoring net income rule).
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ual's tax liability, including items that must be included in gross
income, allowable itemized deductions, and the amount of the indi-
vidual's personal exemption. Thus, when considering future in-
come taxes, the jury must predict more than just the tax rate.47
For example, in estimating an individual's itemized deductions, a
1980 jury would have inaccurately calculated the personal interest
deduction because it could not have foreseen the gradual reduction
and repeal of this allowance. 8 In addition to predicting the tax
laws themselves, a jury must estimate numerous other factors
unique to the taxpayer, including the amount and source of a
plaintiff's other income, 9 whether this other income is derived
from active or passive activity, 50 the number of personal exemp-
tions,51 and the plaintiff's marital status.52
A further complication of the net income rule was addressed
in Liepelt, when the Supreme Court noted that a court applying
the net income rule in a case involving a lump sum award should
add back to the award the amount of taxes the plaintiff would
have to pay on interest earned from investment of the proceeds. 3
To illustrate, assume the plaintiff would have earned $50,000 a
year in income for a period of twenty years, or $1,000,000. The pre-
sent value of this award based on a discount rate of ten percent
would be $425,680. The interest earned on the award, however,
would be taxable.5 4 Thus, the actual net cash available to the
47 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
8 See I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (West Supp. 1988). Personal interest is defined to include in-
terest paid on non-mortgage secured loans, unsecured loans, and credit cards. Id. §
163(h)(2). Congress, however, retained the deduction for qualified residence interest. See id.
§ 163(h)(3).
49 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Gross income includes all income from
whatever sources derived unless specifically excluded. Id.; see also Comment, supra note 6,
at 295 n.47 (tort victim's future outside earnings will affect tax rate and must be considered
by jury); supra note 1 and accompanying text (factors constituting gross income).
50 See RIA Analysis, supra note 44, 11 445-76. The 1986 Tax Reform Act imposed limi-
tations on the deductibility of passive losses; generally, passive losses are deductible only to
the extent of passive income. Id.; see LR.C. § 469(a) (West Supp. 1988).
51 See I.R.C. §§ 151-153 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also Johnson v. Manhattan &
Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 71 N.Y.2d 198, 204, 519 N.E.2d 326, 329, 524
N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1988) (exemptions listed among examples of unknown and unpredictable
variables).
52 See I.R.C. § 1 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
53 See Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 495. But see Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 112
(4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984) (no adjustment allowed for income tax
payable on interest income since award might be invested in tax exempt securities); Sauers
v. Alaska Barge, 600 F.2d 238, 247 (9th Cir. 1979) (same).
See Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59, 59.
1988]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:628
plaintiff would be reduced by the amount of tax he would have to
pay on the interest earned. Accordingly, the "add-back" rule re-
quires that the tax on the interest must be added back to an award
that is calculated on an after-tax basis."
Despite its complex and speculative nature, many courts nev-
ertheless require the use of the net income rule on the theory that
the gross income rule results in overcompensation to the plaintiff. 6
Contrary to this theory, however, in certain circumstances the
gross income rule will actually result in undercompensation to the
plaintiff.5 7 Furthermore, the net income rule may actually increase
a defendant's liability.5" In brief, the argument that the gross in-
come rule necessarily results in overcompensation ignores eco-
nomic realities.5 9
In addition to noting the speculative nature of the net income
See, e.g., DeLucca v. United States, 670 F.2d 843, 849 (9th Cir. 1982) (jury must
reduce award to present value then add back taxes to be paid on investment); Mechan v.
Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (applying New Jersey law in wrong-
ful death action and requiring add back of taxes survivors would pay on investment). But
see Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1348 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (refusing to allow add
back because it would be too complicated for jury to apply), aff'd sub noma. Frankel v.
Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972).
11 See, e.g., Mosley v. United States, 538 F.2d 555, 559 (4th Cir. 1976) (calculation of
actual lost income requires deduction of decedent's ordinary living expenses including in-
come tax); O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 585 (2d Cir. 1959) (same); Brooks v.
United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 628 (D.S.C. 1967) (unless income tax taken into considera-
tion, beneficiaries will receive more than if deceased lived); see also Nordstrom, supra note
6, at 219 (goal of tort remedy is compensation for actual loss).
11 See Franz, Should Income Taxes Be Included When Calculating Lost Earnings?,
TRiAL, Oct. 1982, at 53, 56. Professor Franz discussed the possibilities of both overcompen-
sation and undercompensation of the plaintiff, and the situations where each is likely to
occur. See id. With the use of a computer program, he compared different variations of
damage calculation. See id. He concluded:
[The] failure to deduct income taxes from lost income does not relieve the plain-
tiff of all tax liability, even though the award itself is not taxable. In case of rela-
tively high discount rates.., and fairly long repayment periods, the plaintiff actu-
ally may be undercompensated....
' . * [An award net of taxes on income necessarily undercompensates the
plaintiff, unless the initial award is sufficiently inflated to make allowance for
taxes due on interest.
Id. at 57.
11 See Frolik, supra note 2, at 596-97. Professor Frolik stated that the "[c]oncern that
Liepelt might increase a defendant's liability is not mere conjecture." Id. at 597. He noted
that in one Ninth Circuit case, DeLucca v. United States, 670 F.2d 843, 846 (9th Cir. 1982),
"Jrleducing the loss of future earnings to reflect the effect of taxes, and adding an amount to
compensate for taxes on the investment income resulted in the defendant owing slightly
more than if taxes had been left out of all calculations." Id. at 597 & n.160.
" See id. at 597; see also Franz, supra note 57, at 57 (economic complexities suggest
that simplest method of avoiding overcompensation is gross income rule).
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rule, the Johnson court 0 and others l adhering to the gross income
rule have recognized the difficulties juries have in understanding
and applying evidence concerning income taxes.6 2 Accordingly, if
the net income rule is adopted, a greater use of expert testimony
will be necessary,63 resulting in longer trials and increased litiga-
tion expenses.6
4
Humanitarian Intent
Congress' intent in enacting the exclusion for damages re-
ceived on account of personal injuries is not expressed in the legis-
lative history of section 104(a)(2) .65 As a result, courts must at-
tempt to ascertain for themselves the congressional intent.66
Those that favor the gross income rule believe that within the ex-
10 Johnson, 71 N.Y.2d at 204, 519 N.E.2d at 329, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
01 See, e.g., Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Gordon, 660 P.2d 428, 434-35 (Alaska 1983). The
Alaska Supreme Court refused to overrule its prior holding that future taxes should not be
deducted, reiterating that:
"Income tax rates, provisions relating to deductions and exemptions, and other
aspects of income tax laws and regulations are so subject to change in the future
that we believe that a court cannot predict with sufficient certainty just what
amounts of money a plaintiff would be obliged to pay in federal and state income
taxes on income that he would have earned in the future had it not been for a
defendant's tortious conduct."
Id. at 434 (quoting Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 673 (Alaska 1967)); see also Taenzler v.
Burlington N., Inc., 608 F.2d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1979) (effect of future income taxes too
speculative); Reeves v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 304 So. 2d 370, 377 (La. Ct. App.) (uncertainty
of future tax rates and speculative nature of income tax factors requires rejection of net
income rule), cert. denied, 305 So. 2d 123 (La. 1974).
02 See, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (per
curiam) ("justice is better served if these contingencies, variables and predictions [involved
in estimating taxes] are withheld from the jury's consideration"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839
(1975); Comment, supra note 6, at 294 & n.46 (Liepelt Court did not respond convincingly
to arguments that tax evidence is too complex to present to juries). But see Burlington N.,
Inc. v. Boxbeger, 529 F.2d 284, 293 (9th Cir. 1975) (today's judges and jurors are sophisti-
cated enough to understand evidence with help from experts).
3 See Mayor & Hepburn, The Treatment of Income Taxes in Determining Personal
Injury Awards, 18 Juummurrics J. 186, 208 (1977) (jury will be unable to understand plain-
tiff's tax liability without assistance of experts).
6 See Comment, supra note 6, at 295; see also Yukon Equip., 660 P.2d at 434 (may be
"more burdensome than beneficial"); Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 494, 341
A.2d 613, 623 (1975) (fairness required defendant be given opportunity to introduce evi-
dence of plaintiff's tax liability or to develop matter on cross-examination).
65 See Chapman, supra note 10, at 413-14. Professor Chapman discussed the legislative
history of section 104(a)(2) beginning in 1913. Id. at 413-17; see also Norfolk & W. Ry. v.
Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 496 n.10 (1980) (finding no humanitarian intent in congressional his-
tory); Comment, supra note 6, at 297 & n.61 (congressional intent unclear).
60 See Chapman, supra note 10, at 415-16.
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clusion lies a congressional intent to bestow a humanitarian benefit
upon the victims of torts. 7 In support of this view, they point to
the continued existence of the exclusion since its enactment in
1918.68 In particular, these courts argue that by amending the sec-
tion without repealing the exclusion, Congress has manifested an
intent to benefit the tort victim. 9 One commentator has suggested
that regardless of whether Congress intended to benefit plaintiffs,
"it is doubtful that Congress ever intended Section 104(a)(2) to re-
duce the financial burdens of personal injury defendants. 7
Application of the Net Income Rule-Compounding the Confu-
sion
There is no uniform position among states on whether to ap-
ply the gross income or the net income rule. Further complicating
the matter are decisions permitting introduction of tax evidence
only in certain circumstances. 7 1 For example, some courts have
held that the net income rule should be applied only to past lost
67 See, e.g., Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d 809, 812 (6th Cir. 1978) (tax exemption
for damage awards created for benefit of injured party); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill.
2d 135, 151, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955) (net income rule would thwart congressional intent to
benefit injured party); Dixie Feed & Seed Co. v. Byrd, 52 Tenn. App. 619, 627, 376 S.W.2d
745, 749 (1963) (same), appeal dismissed, 379 U.S. 15 (1964).
68 See Frolik, supra note 2, at 594. Professor Frolik noted: "If section 104(a)(2) was
initially passed as an aid to claimants, or if its continued vitality can best be defended as an
intentional federal subsidy to tort victims, then its ability to perform that humanitarian
function has been severely undercut by Liepelt." Id.; see also Comment, supra note 6, at
297 (Congress apparently sanctioned any overcompensation to tort victims by not repealing
or amending section).
09 See Chapman, supra note 10, at 415-16. Justice Blackmun expressed this viewpoint
in his Liepelt dissent: "By not taxing the award, Congress has bestowed a benefit. Although
the parties disagree over the origin of the tax-free status of the ... award, it is surely clear
that the lost earnings could be taxed as income." Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 500 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also Raines v. New York Cent. R.R.,
51 Ill. 2d 428, 430, 283 N.E.2d 230, 232 (§ 104(a)(2) reflects deliberate congressional intent
to award tax windfall to injured plaintiffs (quoting Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135,
151-52, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955))), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972).
70 Frolik, supra note 2, at 594. Professor Frolik noted that the Liepelt holding will
cause defendants to benefit from section 104(a)(2). Id. But see Comment, supra note 46, at
721 ("Although a reduced award is 'beneficial' to the defendant in a purely economic sense,
it is not actually a true 'benefit' in a legal sense if the law does not define it as such.").
71 See, e.g., Martinez v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 423 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (La.
Ct. App. 1982) (if tax liability would be de minimus, no evidence of tax liability may be
introduced, but question is open in other situations); Marynik v. Burlington N., Inc., 317
N.W.2d 347, 350 (Minn. 1982) (if tax liability not de minimus, evidence should be admit-
ted); see also Comment, supra note 46, at 718-19 (courts apply de minimus concept by
allowing evidence of income taxes only when tax liability severe).
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earnings, not to future lost earnings.12 The rationale for these hold-
ings is that there is no uncertainty in the calculation of taxes a
plaintiff would have paid, since the jury could calculate the taxes
by applying the tax laws existing at the time the income would
have been earned." The flaw in this position is that it will impact
the lost earnings award differently depending on the time period
between injury and trial."'
Some courts apply the net income rule only when the plaintiff
is in an upper income tax bracket. 5 Not only do these decisions
add another factor to the already complex calculation, but courts
find it difficult to delineate upper and lower income tax brackets.76
Proposed Amendment
The problems arising in calculating a plaintiff's future tax lia-
bility led the Johnson court to hold that "without express statu-
tory direction to the contrary, the damages component of a plain-
tiff's award as to lost wages.., should be based on gross projected
earnings and no deduction or consideration of after-tax net should
be allowed into evidence. 77 The need for statutory direction has
been recognized by several commentators.7 8 They have suggested
that the confusion that has led to conflicting decisions in both fed-
eral7 19 and state" courts can be eradicated if Congress amends sec-
72 See, e.g., Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 1977) (applying
Virgin Islands law) (future earnings subject to gross income rule whereas past earnings sub-
ject to net income rule); Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 673 (Alaska 1967) (same).
73 See Varlack, 550 F.2d at 178; Beaulieu, 434 P.2d at 673.
7' See Beaulieu, 434 P.2d at 673.
75 See Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Texasgulf Aviation, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 699, 701-02
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). In Morgan Guaranty, the gap between pre-tax and after-tax income was
extreme: based on a 50% income tax rate the difference was $5,000,000. Id.; see also Savers
v. Alaska Barge & Transp., Inc., 600 F.2d 238, 247 (9th Cir. 1979) (using net income rule for
taxpayers in upper income bracket); First Nat'l Bank v. Material Serv. Corp., 597 F.2d 1110,
1120 (7th Cir. 1979) (using net income rule when tax impact substantial).
7' See McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir.) (trial judge
to decide where to draw the line), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); cf. Burlington N., Inc. v.
Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 294 (9th Cir. 1975) (admission of tax liability evidence depends
more on tax impact than on tax rate).
77 Johnson, 71 N.Y.2d at 206, 519 N.E.2d at 330, 524 N.Y.S. 2d at 419.
78 See Chapman, supra note 10, at 408; Frolik, supra note 2, at 567.
79 Compare Rother v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 540 F. Supp. 477, 486 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (net income rule should apply), afl'd, 722 F.2d 734 (3d Cir. 1983) and Roselli v. Hel-
lenic Lines, 524 F. Supp. 2, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same) and DeWeese v. United States, 419 F.
Supp. 170, 172 (D. Colo. 1976) (damages for lost income should be based upon "take home"
pay), afl'd, 576 F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1978) with Taenzler v. Burlington N., Inc., 608 F.2d 796,
802 (8th Cir. 1979) (trial court's application of gross income rule not error) and Kalivity v.
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tion 104(a)(2) to bring it into conformity with generally accepted
tax theory.81 Currently, section 104(a)(2) excludes amounts re-
ceived for lost earnings, notwithstanding the fact that these pay-
ments merely reimburse plaintiffs for amounts that would have
been included in gross income.82 Furthermore, other types of com-
pensation that closely parallel the lost earnings component of a
personal injury damage award are includable in gross income.8 3
The proposed amendments would repeal the exclusion for damages
received as lost earnings in personal injury and wrongful death ac-
tions, 4 and could be tailored to incorporate a preferential treat-
United States, 584 F.2d 809, 812-13 (6th Cir. 1978) (gross income rule applicable to lower
and middle income tax brackets) and Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236-37
(5th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam) (apply gross income rule to avoid speculation and burden
on administration of justice), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
80 Compare Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 582, 271 A.2d 94, 97
(1970) (consideration of tax evidence limited to wrongful death cases) and Adams v. Deur,
173 N.W.2d 100, 105 (Iowa 1969) (same) and Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466,
494-95, 341 A.2d 613, 625 (1975) (net income rule should apply) with Seely v. McEvers, 115
Ariz. 171, 174, 564 P.2d 394, 397 (Ct. App. 1977) (gross income rule in negligence case) and
Harper v. Liggett Group, Inc., 459 So. 2d 1260, 1263 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (gross income rule
should apply in product liability case), cert. denied, 462 So. 2d 655 (La. 1985) and Dinger v.
Department of Natural Resources, 147 Mich. App. 164, 179, 383 N.W.2d 606, 613 (1985)
(gross income rule should apply in negligence case).
81 See Frolik, supra note 2, at 605. Professor Frolik concluded:
Congress should amend section 104(a)(2) to repeal the tax exemption for amounts
paid as compensation for lost income. This reform would avoid the complicated
interplay of numerous variables introduced by the [net income rule]. By removing
this obstacle and bringing section 104(a)(2) into conformity with generally ac-
cepted tax theory, personal injury claimants and defendants could put away their
tax codes and concentrate on fundamental issues of liability and the calculation of
damages.
Id.; see also Comment, supra note 6, at 297 (Congress could repeal statutory exclusion of
lost income awards).
82 See Morris, Taxing Economic Loss Recovered in Personal Injury Actions: Towards
a Capital Idea?, 38 U. FLA. L. REv. 735, 736 (1986). Professor Morris notes that it "seems
improper to exclude from income an economic benefit which would have been included had
it not been received incident to a personal tort action." Id. at 760.
8 See Frolik, Personal Injury Compensation as a Tax Preference, 37 M. L. REv. 1, 13
(1985). For example, a "continuation of pay" award, which provides a federal employee
compensation for a traumatic injury, is not excluded from gross income. Id. Professor Frolik
discussed the taxability of income received under Internal Revenue Code sections 37, 104,
and 105, stating that "[e]quity would seem to be better served by comparable treatment
among these forms of compensation, which might come in the form of... all compensation
for lost earnings coupled with a generous deduction scheme for disability engendered ex-
penses." Id.
84 Congress can, if it so chooses, tax a particular item of income at a preferential rate,
and has done so. For example, prior to the 1986 revision of the Internal Revenue Code, a
taxpayer was allowed to deduct 60% of capital gains from gross income. Act of Nov. 6, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-600, tit. IV, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2867, repealed by Act of Oct. 22, 1986, Pub. L.
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ment of this income,85 thereby allowing Congress to continue to
confer a humanitarian benefit on the tort victim.8 6
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The issue of whether a jury should be instructed on the non-
taxability of a personal injury damage award has recently been ad-
dressed by the New York Court of Appeals in Lanzano v. City of
New York.8 7 In Lanzano, the plaintiff contended that the trial
court's instructions to the jury that the award would not be subject
to income tax were prejudicial and caused the jury to return a
smaller verdict than it would have absent the instruction. 8 The
court rejected the argument, stating that ignorance of a relevant
rule in a complex field could contribute to a jury proceeding on
erroneous speculations and "rendering unfair and inaccurate ver-
dicts."'89 Writing for the court, Judge Bellacosa stated that "it is
better practice in all cases where jury awards are excluded from
taxation ... for the jury to be instructed in substance that such
awards.., are not subject to income taxes, and that it should not
add or subtract from the award on account of income taxes."90 Ac-
cordingly, the Lanzano court held that the instruction that had
been given was not error and expressly authorized its use."1 The
United States Supreme Court considered the jury instruction issue
No. 99-514, tit. III, § 301(a), 99 Stat. 2216.
11 See Morris, supra note 82, at 747. Professor Morris suggested three alternative
amendments to section 104(a)(2) that would each treat a personal injury award preferen-
tially. Id. The first is the exclusion model which would exclude 50% of the amount received
from gross income. Id. at 752. The second would treat the amount as a capital gain. Id. at
753. The third would offer an election to treat the income as if it were received over a period
of five years, thus avoiding the harshness of having the award taxed in one year. Id. at 757.
11 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
97 71 N.Y.2d 208, 519 N.E.2d 331, 524 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1988).
11 Id. at 211, 519 N.E.2d at 331, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
89 Id., 519 N.E.2d at 332, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
90 Id. at 212, 519 N.E.2d at 332, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
91 Id., 519 N.E.2d at 333, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 422. In expressly authorizing such an instruc-
tion, the court stated that it was building on the holding in Coleman v. New York City
Transit Authority, 37 N.Y.2d 137, 332 N.E.2d 850, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1975). Lanzano, 71
N.Y. 2d at 213, 519 N.E.2d at 333, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 422. The court in Coleman held that
trial courts are "not required to charge the jury that any award to the plaintiff would be free
of income tax." Coleman, 37 N.Y.2d at 145, 332 N.E.2d at 855, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 670. The
Lanzano court, however, stated that "[t]o the extent that Coleman ... has been read as
being inconsistent with this holding, that interpretation is declared erroneous." Lanzano, 71
N.Y.2d at 213, 519 N.E.2d at 333, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
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in Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt,9 2 holding that it was er-
ror for the trial court to refuse the instruction requested by the
defendant.9 3 The Court concluded that it was "entirely possible" a
jury would believe an award was subject to income taxes and, as a
result of this belief, substantially increase the award to fully com-
pensate the injured party.9 4 Writing for the majority, Justice Ste-
vens approved the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Burlingham North-
ern, Inc. v. Boxberger95 that "giving the instruction can do no
harm, and it can certainly help by preventing the jury from inflat-
ing the award. '9 6 In contrast, Justice Blackmun, dissenting in
Liepelt, stated that the instruction "does nothing more than call a
basically irrelevant factor to the jury's attention, and then directs
the jury to forget that matter. '9 7 Responding to the majority's ar-
gument that the jury might increase the award on the erroneous
belief that it would be subject to income taxes, Justice Blackmun
pointed out that it was also "'entirely possible' that the jury 'may'
increase its damages award in the belief that the defendant is in-
sured, or that the plaintiff will be obligated for substantial attor-
ney's fees . . . or on the basis of any number of other extraneous
factors."9 " For this reason, Justice Blackmun regarded the required
instruction as "almost an affront to the practical wisdom of the
jury" and stated that it opened the door to courts requiring that
the jury be charged about every "conceivable matter as to which it
should not misbehave or miscalculate." 99
Jury Instruction Should be Discretionary
A number of courts have held that, upon request, the jury
must be instructed on the nontaxability of a personal injury or
wrongful death award.100 These opinions aim to safeguard against
92 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
93 Id. at 496-98.
94 Id. at 496.
529 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1975).
Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 498 (quoting Boxberger, 529 F.2d at 297); see Comment, supra
note 6, at 293 n.37 (absent instruction, jury likely to increase award).
" Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 502 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 503 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100 See, e.g., Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines, 678 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant in
FELA action entitled to limiting instruction to jury), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1206 (1983);
Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th Cir. 1975) ("giving the instruction
can do no harm, and it can certainly help by preventing the jury from inflating the award");
Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d Cir.) (applied prospectively),
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the possibility that a jury may increase a verdict on the mistaken
assumption that the award is subject to income tax.101 Opponents
of this viewpoint argue that such an instruction could prejudice
the plaintiff.10 2 They argue that this instruction is illogical and cre-
ates confusion because while it brings the issue of taxation to the
jury's attention, most courts later instruct the jury that the issue is
irrelevant and should not be considered.103
It is submitted that rather than a blanket rule allowing or dis-
allowing the instruction that the award is not taxable, a better ap-
proach would be to leave the decision to the trial judge. One court
has stated:
Where there is nothing in the evidence bearing on taxes, and the
lawyers do not mention the subject in front of the jury, no in-
struction on the subject may be needed... [and] [w]here the sub-
ject of income taxes on the amount of the verdict has been
brought to the attention of the jury in a serious way, the judge
must exercise his best judgment and discretion, and frank disclo-
sure that the amount of the verdict is not subject to Federal or
State income taxation may be the better course.104
Based on this viewpoint, it is further submitted that the in-
struction be given only if the issue has been brought to the jury's
attention during trial, or if the jury itself inquired about the taxa-
bility of the award during deliberations.105 In these situations,
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); Abele v. Massi, 273 A.2d 260, 261 (Del. 1970) (same);
Bussell v. DeWalt Prods. Corp., 105 N.J. 223, 229, 519 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1987) (upon request,
instruction should be given); supra note 9. But see, e.g., Scruggs v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.,
320 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Va. 1970) (improper to instruct jury on nontaxability of
award); Klawonn v. Mitchell, 105 Ill. 2d 450, 453-58, 475 N.E.2d 857, 859-61 (1985) (same);
Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 534-35 (Me. 1978) (same).
101 See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 496 (1980). The Supreme Court
stated, "[I]t is entirely possible that the members of the jury may assume that a plaintiff's
recovery in a case of this kind will be subject to federal taxation, and that the award should
be increased substantially." Id. Dean Nordstrom advocates the position that juries must be
made aware of the tax exemption for personal injury awards in order to avoid the problem
of overcompensation. Nordstrom, supra note 6, at 236; see cases cited supra note 100.
102 See Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 151, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955) ("it is
conceivable that the plaintiff could be prejudiced"); see also Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz.
398, 403-04, 298 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1956) (relying, in part, on Hall rationale).
oI See Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 502 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun disagreed
with the majority's holding that the jury instruction should be given and stated: "[The in-
struction] does nothing more than call a basically irrelevant factor to the jury's attention,
and then directs the jury to forget the matter." Id.
I" Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 380 Mass. 362, 370, 403 N.E.2d 402, 408 (1980).
'05 See, e.g., Kennett v. Delta Air Lines, 560 F.2d 456, 461-62 (1st Cir. 1977) (during
deliberations jury inquired about tax ramifications of award); Towli v. Ford Motor Co., 30
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there is less danger of prejudicing the plaintiff because the issue
has not been affirmatively brought to the jury's attention.'
CONCLUSION
The wisdom of utilizing the gross income rule rather than the
net income rule has become more apparent since the enactment of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Prior to its enactment, it was argued
that future income taxes could be estimated, and that this task was
not unduly speculative. The sweeping changes that occurred upon
the passage of the Act, however, should compel reevaluation of this
argument. Furthermore, even if it were possible to estimate future
tax laws with a reasonable degree of accuracy, it must be
remembered that the calculation of an individual's income tax is
complex and responsive to numerous other factors. This combina-
tion of the speculativeness and the complexity of projecting an in-
dividual's tax liability has led to a wide disparity in the decisions
of both federal and state courts. This Note has suggested that a
logical solution would be for Congress to amend section 104(a)(2)
to remove the tax exempt treatment of the lost earnings portion of
damages. This element could be taxed at a preferential rate, thus
retaining a humanitarian benefit for injured plaintiffs while, at the
same time, eliminating conflicting decisions among the courts. In
the absence of legislative action, courts should implement the gross
income rule. The use of the gross income rule would prevent the
jury's deliberations from becoming unduly complex.
This Note has also considered the question of whether to in-
struct the jury that the entire award is not subject to taxation, and
has suggested that the approach least likely to prejudice the plain-
tiff or confuse the jury is to leave the decision to the discretion of
the trial judge. Moreover, it would be preferable for the trial judge
to give this instruction only when the issue has already been
brought to the jury's attention.
Lorraine Stacknowitz Boss
App. Div. 2d 319, 320, 292 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (1st Dep't 1968) (during deliberations jury inquired
whether plaintiff had to pay taxes).
10' See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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